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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Keith Allan Brown appeals from the judgment of conviction and sentence
entered upon his conditional Alford pleas to voluntary manslaughter and
accessory to grand theft.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
Mr. Leslie Breaw was reported missing under suspicious circumstances
after his vehicle was found seemingly abandoned. (Officer Ingram's Report, PSI
attachment, p.A6.) Law enforcement received information that Brown, who was
Breaw's neighbor, and his wife Tyrah Brown were also gone from the area,
having left in a hurry. (Officer Ingram's Report, PSI attachment, p.A8.)

The

police also discovered Brown had conducted transactions using Breaw's debit
card after Breaw's disappearance.

(Officer Ingram's Report, PSI attachment,

p.A9.) Breaw's body was ultimately found concealed in an area of brush near his
abandoned vehicle. (PSI, p.2.)
Brown was arrested in Florida on a fugitive warrant and extradited to
Idaho on a grand theft charge.

(Tr., p.166, L.12 - p.169, L.18.)

The state

charged Brown with first degree murder, grand theft by possession of stolen
property, and felon in possession of a firearm. (R. pp.184-186.) Brown was later
deemed unable to assist in his own defense and was ordered committed from
August 25,2008 until January 13, 2009. (R., pp.486-488; 495-496; 591-592.)
Following mediation (R., pp.812-814), the state filed an amended
information charging Brown with voluntary manslaughter and accessory to grand
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theft (R., pp.878-879). Brown filed a reservation of issues for appeal (R., pp.900901) and entered a conditional Alford plea to the amended charges with the
following negotiated resolution:
Your Honor, the terms of the plea agreement are that Mr.
Brown will have an opportunity to present three additional motions
- or basically it's one motion to suppress with three independent
grounds. He will - the State will amend the charge to voluntary
manslaughter, and the grand theft charge will be amended to
accessory to a grand theft after the fact. Mr. Brown will enter Alford
pleas to both charges and reserve his appellate rights in writing to
challenge all pretrial motions.
The sentences - the State would agree to have sentences
on both charges run concurrently and that we would enter into a
Rule 11 agreement with you, Your Honor, that you would after that
any sentence imposed would run concurrently on both charges.
Other than that, there would be open recommendations. The State
has indicated it will recommend a fixed 15-year term.
(Tr., p.377, L.12 - p.378, L.4.)
The court sentenced Brown to 10 years fixed followed by five years
indeterminate on the voluntary manslaughter and five years fixed for accessory
to grand theft, the sentences to run concurrently. (Tr., p.452, L.14- p.453, L.5;
R., pp.935-938; 941-944.) Brown timely filed a notice of appeal. (R., pp.959-

964.)
Brown then filed a Rule 35 motion requesting leniency. (R., pp.971-972.)
The district court denied the Rule 35 motion following a hearing.
pp.42-43.)

2

(Supp. R.,

ISSUES
Brown states the issues on appeal as:
1. Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Brown's Motion to Exclude
from Evidence Defendant's Mail Correspondence obtained in violation
of the Fourth Amendment?
2. Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Brown's motions to
suppress evidence obtained as a result of his arrest because material
exculpatory information discovered after the issuance of the arrest
warrant undermined the magistrate's probable cause finding?
3. Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Brown's motion to suppress
statements obtained when he was incapable of intelligently and
voluntarily waiving his right to remain silent because the State failed to
establish that his statements were made voluntarily?
4. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Brown's
request to present testimony at the hearing on his Rule 35 motion and
denied his motion without considering the new information he provided
in support?
5. Mindful of this Court's holding in State v. Manzaneres, did the district
court err when it denied Mr. Brown's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of
Probable Cause at Preliminary Hearing?
6. Mindful of the inapplicability of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
and 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (c) in a state court prosecution, did the district
court nevertheless err when it denied Mr. Brown's motion to suppress
statements obtained in violation of those provisions?
(Appellant's brief, p.5.)
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as:
1. Has Brown failed to establish error in the district court's denial of his
motion to exclude evidence of jail correspondence?
2. Has Brown failed to show any error in the denial of his motion to suppress
evidence obtained as a result of his arrest pursuant to a valid arrest
warrant?
3. Has Brown failed to show error in the denial of his motion to suppress
statements as involuntary?
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4. Has Brown failed to establish the district court erred in not allowing
additional testimony at his Rule 35 plea for leniency?
5. Has Brown failed to show any reason why State v. Manzaneres is not
controlling?
6. Has Brown failed to establish the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure are
applicable in a court proceeding?

4

ARGUMENTS
I.
Brown Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of His Motion To Exclude Mail
Correspondence

A.

Introduction
Brown challenges the denial of his motion to exclude evidence of his mail

correspondence obtained while Brown was incarcerated.

Specifically, Brown

asserts
the district court erred when it denied his motion because he
established that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated when
the jail opened and photocopied all of his non-legal, outgoing mail
without presenting evidence that such activities were conducted
pursuant to a search warrant or a recognized exception to the
Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement.
(Appellant's brief, p.8.)

Because an inmate's privacy rights are necessarily

limited and the state acted within its general practice, Brown's argument fails.

B.

Standard Of Review
"The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a

decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the
trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely
reviews the application of constitutional principles to those facts." State v. Diaz,
144 Idaho 300, 302, 160 P.3d 739, 741 (2007).

The power to assess the

credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw
factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho
102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Fleenor, 133 Idaho 552, 555, 989
P.2d 784, 787 (Ct. App. 1999). The appellate court also gives deference to any
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implicit findings of the trial court supported by substantial evidence.

State v.

Brauch, 133 Idaho 215,218,984 P.2d 703,706 (1999).

C.

The District Court Correctly Denied Brown's Motion To Exclude Evidence
Of His Mail Correspondence From Trial
In Mallery v. Lewis, 106 Idaho 227, 678 P.2d 19 (1984), this Court held

that
security and governmental interest justifies the imposition of certain
restraints on inmate correspondence. Such interference was held to
be justified if the regulation or practice in question furthers an
important or substantial governmental interest such as security,
order, or rehabilitation. Procunier, supra, held that the limitations of
first amendment freedoms must be no greater than is necessary or
essential to the protection of the particular governmental interest
involved. Id. at 413, 94 S.Ct. at 1811.
Mallery, 106 Idaho at 231, 678 P.2d at 23 (citing Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S.
396 (1974).

"It is clear that the screening of mail for escape plans, obscene

material, violation of prison rules, and contraband furthers a substantial
governmental interest."

kL.

In denying Brown's motion to exclude evidence from his correspondence
while in jail, the district court found:
The - it seems to me that what - the issue has been framed
in terms of a constitutional right to privacy, as I understand it, as
opposed to any particular privilege claimed under the Idaho Rules
of Evidence. And, first, it sounds like there was a policy in effect for
the Bonner County jail regarding communications from prisoners
and that there is really is no right to privacy, at least of the nature
asserted here, to communications which would be in violation of jail
rules. The attack here seems to be on the jail policy of monitoring
mail. And it doesn't seem to me that probable case [sic] is probably
required for such a policy, that there are good reasons for any jail to
have such a policy and particularly with reasons related to security
issues.
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However, based upon the showing that's been made here
today, to the extent that probable cause was required for
implementation of the jail policy with respect particularly to Mr.
Brown, that probable cause did exist. It seems to me also that the
policy, itself, is a constitutional - the policy passes constitutional
muster. Accordingly, the motion regarding the defendant's mail
correspondence is denied.
(Tr., p.371, L.21 - p.372, L.19.)

Although Brown does not pursue a First

Amendment claim on appeal (Appellant's brief, p.7, n.11), he does assert the
district court erred in denying his motion to exclude correspondence "because he
established that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated when the jail opened
and photocopied all of his non-legal, outgoing mail" without first obtaining a
warrant or establishing a valid exception to the warrant requirement (Appellant's
brief, p.8).
Brown cites the Ninth Circuit for the proposition that an inmate has a
reasonable expectation of privacy in a sealed letter. (Appellant's brief, pp.9-10.)
Brown cites specifically to U.S. v. Savage, 482 F.2d 1371, 1373 (9th Cir. 1973),
which held "absent a showing of some justifiable purpose of imprisonment or
prison security the interception and photocopying of the letter was violative of the
fourth amendment and the letter should have been excluded as evidence."
However, not even the Ninth Circuit has been consistent its interpretation of the
privacy nature of inmate jail. In a case predating Savage, it noted "prison officials
may examine the communications of a prisoner without infringing upon his
rights." U.S. v. Wilson, 447 F.2d 1,8, n. 4 (9 th Cir. 1971).
Other courts have recognized that the expectation of privacy by those
incarcerated is necessarily limited:
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In Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S. 15,40 S.Ct. 50,64 L.Ed. 103
(1919), the Supreme Court held that interception by prison
personnel and use in evidence by the prosecution of certain letters
containing incriminating material written by a federal prisoner, who
had been charged with the murder of a prison guard, did not violate
the fourth amendment rights of the accused. The Court noted that
the letters were voluntarily written and that no threat or coercion
was used to obtain them. The Court added that the letters came
into the possession of officials of the penitentiary under established
practice, reasonably designed to promote the discipline of the
institution. (citation omitted).
More recent cases since Stroud have held that a prisoner's
fourth amendment rights are not violated when his mail is inspected
by jail officials. See Smith v. Shimp, 562 F.2d 423, 427 (yth Cir.
1977); U.S. v. Wilson, 447 F.2d 1, n. 4 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied
sub nom. Polk V. United States, 404 U.S. 1053, 92 S.Ct. 723, 30
L.Ed.2d 742 (1972). Still more recent cases have limited Stroud,
finding violations of the fourth amendment absent a showing of a
justifiable purpose of imprisonment or prison security. (citations
omitted).
It is apparent, even if Stroud does not retain all of its vitality,
that the actions of the prison officials were justified in light of the
legitimate objectives of the prison system. In Lyons V. Farrier, 727
F.2d 766, 769 (8 th Circ.1984), this court held that, although
prisoners retain some fourth amendment rights while in prison,
these rights are limited by institutional security needs and the
prisoner's reduced expectation of privacy.
U.S. v. Kelton, 791 F.2d 101, 102-103 (8 th Cir. 1986).
We are cognizant of earlier federal decisions which found a
limited right of privacy in inmate letters.
See Palmigiano v.
Travisono, 317 F.Supp.776 (D.R.1.1970); United States v. Savage,
482 F.2d 1371 (9 th Cir. 1973). We feel, however, that the Supreme
Court's announcement of valid government policies and procedures
in Hudson [v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984)] is sufficient to justify us
in abandoning these cases.
We are also cognizant of the
considerable jurisprudence holding inmate mail may be censored
for the furtherance of a substantial government interest such as
security or discipline. (citations omitted.) We feel that if complete
censorship is permissible, then the lesser included act of opening
the mail and reading it is also permissible. (citations omitted.)
State

V.

Dunn, 478 So.2d 659, 663 (LA Ct. App. 1985).
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At least one court has recognized "the prevailing view is that there is no
constitutional violation" in reading the outgoing mail of inmates. Busby v. Dretke,
359 F.3d 708, 716 (5 th Cir. 2004). See also Stow v. Grimaldi, 993 F.2d 1002,
1004 (1st Cir.1993) (holding a "New Hampshire State Prison practice of requiring
non-privileged outgoing mail to be submitted for inspection in unsealed
envelopes" is not a constitutional violation); Smith v. Delo, 995 F.2d 827, 832 (8th
Cir.1993) (prison officials justified in screening out-going non-privileged mail for
escape plans, contraband, threats or evidence of illegality). If this Court follows
the prevailing view that there is no constitutional violation in the review of inmate
jail, the district court's order to deny Brown's motion to suppress must be
affirmed.
Brown contends the state did not meet its burden in establishing an
exception to the warrant requirement. (Appellant's brief, p.10.) It is the state's
position, however, that based on the aforementioned line of cases, such a
showing is unnecessary. The district court found there was a jail policy in place
"regarding communications from prisoners" (Tr., p.371, L.25 - p.372, L.2), and
this finding has not been challenged.

Brown's mail was reviewed in a manner

consistent with that policy and was not a violation of a constitutionally protected
reasonable expectation of privacy.
Even if the Court were to require a basis for a warrantless search in the
screening of outgoing inmate correspondence, the district court found that as
well. The arguments presented to the district court at hearing on the motion to
exclude included information of Brown's extensive criminal history, his previous
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possession of identity fraud documents, his communications with convicted
felons incarcerated elsewhere and his continued communications with other
people charged with violent crimes, all which showed Brown presented security
issues to the jail that justified the review of his outgoing correspondence. (See
generally Tr., pp.368-370.) The district court not only found a valid government
interest in screening Brown's mail but held the circumstances surrounding
Brown's behavior and pattern of communications while incarcerated was
sufficient probable cause to search his mail. (Tr., p.372, Ls.11-19.) The district
court correctly denied Brown's motion to exclude.

II.
Brown Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Erred In Denying His
Motion To Suppress Evidence Obtained As A Result Of The Execution Of A Valid
Warrant For His Arrest

A.

Introduction
Brown filed multiple motions in support of his position that any evidence

obtained subsequent to his arrest pursuant to a warrant for the offense of grand
theft was suppressible because the state failed to advise the original warrant
issuing court of potentially exculpatory evidence discovered in the approximate
one-month time period between the issuance of the arrest warrant and its
subsequent execution. (Appellant's brief, pp.11-13.)
Because there is nothing in the record to support a finding that false
statements were knowing and intentionally made in the affidavit supporting the
original arrest warrant, Brown's argument fails.
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B.

Standard Of Review
"The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a

decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the
trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely
reviews the application of constitutional principles to those facts." State v. Diaz,
144 Idaho 300, 302, 160 P.3d 739, 741 (2007).

The power to assess the

credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw
factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho
102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Fleenor, 133 Idaho 552,555,989
P.2d 784, 787 (Ct. App. 1999). The appellate court also gives deference to any
implicit findings of the trial court supported by substantial evidence.

State v.

Brauch, 133 Idaho 215,218,984 P.2d 703, 706 (1999).

C.

Brown Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Erred In Denying
His Motion To Suppress Evidence Obtained Subsequent To His Arrest
In its order denying Brown's motion to suppress, the district court found

the following:
At a search warrant and arrest warrant hearing conducted in
the afternoon of February 6, 2007[,] Bonner County Deputy Sheriff
Tony Ingram testified that defendant had been seen using the
financial transaction card of his employer, Leslie Breaw, who was
apparently missing. Defendant and his wife lived in a house owned
by Breaw, which was located next door to Breaw's house.
Although there is evidence that another officer had information that
Breaw had used the card after defendant used it, there is no
evidence that, at the warrant hearing, Ingram knew about Breaw's
subsequent use. Ingram testified that the card was missing from
Breaw's wallet, which had been found in his apparently abandoned
vehicle. He also testified that defendant had hurriedly moved away.
The magistrate issued search and arrest warrants based upon a
11

finding of probable cause for "fraudulent use of a financial
transaction card or grand theft."
After the warrant hearing, police obtained information that
Breaw's renters had paid defendant rent they owed Breaw, but
apparently that rent money had never been forwarded to Breaw.
Others told police that Breaw had used his financial transaction
card after defendant used it. Police discovered that a $56,000
escrow check belonging to Breaw was deposited into a bank
account opened in the name of defendant's wife on January 24,
2007 and closed the next day. Rebekah Harding [Brown's motherin-law] told police that on March 1 defendant had given her $7,000.
Harding also told police that defendant had used Breaw's financial
transaction card with Breaw's permission. Harding had moved
away at the same time defendant and his wife moved. On March
19, a dead body, suspected to be that of Breaw, was found in a
wooded area near the homes of the defendant and Breaw. Police
arrested defendant the next day.

(2/1/10 Memorandum Opinion and Order re: Motions to Suppress, pp.2-3
(citations omitted).)
Brown moved to suppress the evidence found subsequent to his arrest
pursuant to both the search warrant and the arrest warrant for grand theft,
claiming an insufficient basis for a finding of probable cause. (R., pp.277-279,
293-294.)

Brown also gave notice of his intent to seek a Franks 1 hearing. (R.,

pp.648-649.) At the initial appearance on the Franks hearing, Brown asked the
district court to decide if Brown had "made a substantial preliminary showing that
there is a reason to give him a hearing to challenge" the statements made to the
magistrate judge in issuing the arrest warrant for grand theft. (Tr., p.113, LsA-9.)
Brown made clear at the hearing, however, he was not attempting to challenge
the search warrant through a Franks hearing. (Tr., p.128, Ls.3-4.)
In denying Brown's motion to suppress, the district court concluded:

1 Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978).

12

The magistrate found probable cause for "fraudulent use of
financial transaction card or grand theft" and issued search and
arrest warrants as a result. According to defendant, probable
cause for the arrest warrant would have been eliminated if Deputy
[Ingram] had presented evidence that Breaw had used his financial
transaction card after defendant used it. The record does not show
that any such evidence was intentionally or recklessly withheld as
required by Franks, or that Ingram even knew of this evidence at
the warrant hearing. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how, at the
warrant hearing, one could intentionally or recklessly omit unknown
information.
Even if at the warrant hearing Deputy Ingram had known of,
and intentionally or recklessly omitted, evidence of Breaw's
subsequent card use, defendant has not shown "a substantial
probability" that had this evidence been presented at the warrant
hearing, "it would have altered the magistrate's finding of probable
cause." [Citation omitted.] The evidence presented at the hearing
also included not only defendant's use of the card, but information
from neighbors and family that Breaw's whereabouts were
unknown; his dogs were unfed and running loose; his abandoned
vehicle contained his wallet; his financial transaction card was
missing from that wallet; and defendant and his wife had hurriedly
moved from the area. This evidence combined with the allegedly
omitted evidence supported the magistrate's probable cause
determination.
(Exhibit: 2/01/10 Memorandum Opinion and Order Re: Motions to Suppress,
pp.5-6.)

In a subsequent hearing on the motion to suppress the evidence

obtained pursuant Brown's arrest in Florida, the district court found the following
when denying Brown's motion to suppress:
Turning those general propositions to the issues before the
court, the first issue is - concerns probable cause for the crime. At
the search warrant hearing, a magistrate found probable cause to
believe that defendant committed the crime of fraudulent use of a
financial transaction card or grand theft. The evidence supporting
this finding included a showing that Breaw was missing under
suspicious circumstances at about the time the defendant was
videotaped using his financial transaction card and that Breaw's
wallet had been found in his abandoned truck with no financial
transaction cards present and that defendant had hurriedly moved
from his home that was located on the alleged victim's property.
13

The fair implication of this evidence was that the defendant had
used the victim's card without permission, and these facts connect
the circumstances of Mr. Breaw's disappearance to defendant's
use of Breaw's card, providing probable cause to issue a search
warrant for evidence related to his disappearance.
(Tr., p.360, L.24 - p.361, L.i8.)
Brown asserts on appeal the district court erred in denying his motion to
suppress evidence made following his arrest in Florida when it "concluded that
the magistrate's probable cause finding would not have been different had she
been informed of the material exculpatory information learned after the issuance
of the warrant but before its execution." (Appellant's brief, p.i8.)

The original

grand theft charge was dismissed by the state upon Brown's return to Idaho
wherein a new criminal complaint was filed alleging the crimes of first degree
murder, grand theft by possession, and felon in possession of a firearm with
enhancements for being a persistent violator and for using a firearm in the course
of the commission of one of the alleged crimes. (R., pp.54-56; Tr., p.137, Ls.18.) When making the probable cause finding for the new charges, the magistrate
took judicial notice of the testimony for the issuance of the previous search
warrant over a month prior (R., pp.34-51) in addition to receiving more testimony,
including statements Brown made to law enforcement after his arrest. (R., pp.5153.) Those statements appear to be the object of Brown's claim for suppression
on appeal.

Brown contends on appeal that had he not been arrested on an

invalid warrant in Florida, he would not have been in a position to make
statements against his interest which were later used as evidence for the
charges filed against him upon his return to Idaho. (Appellant's brief, pp.18-1 g.)
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Brown argues the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress
evidence obtained as a result of his arrest pursuant to an invalid arrest warrant
which should have been invalidated at the Franks hearing.

(Appellant's brief,

p.18.) Idaho courts do recognize Franks hearings in relations to search warrants:
Idaho has adopted the rule established in Franks and has made
clear that a warrant is valid even if probable cause is based on
false evidence so long as the evidence is not presented
intentionally or with reckless disregard for the truth.
State v. Fisher, 140 Idaho 365, 369-370, 93 F.3d 696, 700-701 (2004).

The

issue of the applicability of a Franks hearing to an arrest warrant, however, has
not been considered by an Idaho appellate court and Brown points to no
compelling reason why this court should adopt such a view. The Second Circuit
noted in U.S. v. Awadallah, 349 F.3 42, 64 n. 17 (2 nd Cir. 2003), that neither it nor
the United States Supreme Court has extended the Franks holding to arrest
warrants. (Citations omitted.) Although the Fourth and Fifth Circuit courts have
extended Franks to arrest warrants, see

~

U.S. v. Colkley, 899 F.2d 297, 299-

303 (4 th Circ. 1990); U.S. v. Martin, 615 F.2d 318, 327-329 (5 th Circ. 1980), there
is still the necessary showing of a -"deliberate falsehood" or "reckless disregard
for the truth." Colkley, 899 F.3d at 303 (citation omitted).

Because there is no

Idaho case law on point and Brown has shown no compelling reason, this Court
should decline to apply the Franks holding to arrest warrants, thereby affirming
without further inquiry the district court's denial of Brown's motion to suppress.
However, if the Court does review the district court's Franks analysis and
its subsequent denial of Brown's motion to suppress, Brown has failed to
establish any error by the district court. Although he contends on appeal there
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existed potentially exculpatory evidence found subsequent to the original
probable cause finding, that is not the proper test under Franks. Brown appears
to cite U.S. v. Marin-Buitrago, 734 F.2d 889, 894 (2 nd Circ. 1984), holding
when a definite and material change has occurred in the facts
underlying the magistrate's determination of probable cause, it is
the magistrate, not the executing officers, who must determine
whether probable cause still exists. Therefore, the magistrate
must be made aware of any material new or correcting
information[,]
for the proposition that law enforcement was under an ongoing obligation to
present newly discovered information to the warrant issuing magistrate up to the
point of arrest. (Appellant's brief, pp.18-20.) The existence of new information
alone, however, does not end the inquiry. As discussed in U.S. v. Perez, 484
F.3d 735, 743 (5 th Cir. 2007),
When this decision is read in full, however, it becomes clear
that Marin-Buitrago does not support [the defendant's] position that
the evidence from his residence be suppressed. Therein, the
Second Circuit indicated that the evidence resulting from the search
should be suppressed only when the new information brought the
level of probability below what was necessary for probable cause.
Thus the court stated that "[i]n determining on this appeal whether
the affidavit still supports a finding of probable cause after the
inclusion of [the new information], we must assume the role of the
issuing magistrate."
After concluding that "[e]ven with the
supplemental information, the affidavit clearly establishes, by a fair
probability," that the search would produce evidence of narcotics,
and that therefore "the warrant for the search ... was supported by
probable cause at the time it was executed," the court upheld the
district court's denial of the defendant's motion to suppress.
(Citations omitted) (emphasis added).
The record supports ,the district court's conclusion that the magistrate
would have still found probable cause for the offense of grand theft by
possession based on the circumstances surrounding the victim Breaw's
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disappearance taken with the circumstances of Brown's actions and subsequent
flight. Brown has failed to establish the district court erred in denying his motion
to suppress.

III.
Brown Has Failed To Establish The District Court Erred In Denying His Motion To
Suppress Statements To Law Enforcement as Involuntary

A

Introduction
Brown asserts the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress

statements he made to law enforcement following his arrest because he was not
capable of voluntarily waiving his right to remain silent because he was of
unsound mind at the time the statements were made as was evidenced by
Brown's subsequent court-ordered commitment based on the determination that
he was incapable of assisting his defense. (Appellant's brief, pp.23-25.)
Brown failed to show the district court erred in denying his motion to
suppress.

B.

Standard Of Review
The Idaho Supreme Court, recognizing that the validity of a waiver of

Miranda rights presents a question of fact, has held:
When reviewing a denial of a motion to suppress evidence, this
Gourt defers to the findings of the trial court unless they are clearly
erroneous. When statements made by a defendant during the
course of an in-custody interrogation are offered at trial, the State
"must establish a voluntary, knowing and intelligent waiver of the
suspect's rights." The trial court's conclusion that a defendant made
a knowing and voluntary waiver of his Miranda rights will not be
disturbed on appeal where it is supported by substantial and
competent evidence.
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State v. Luke, 134 Idaho 294, 297, 1 P.3d 795, 798 (2000) (citations omitted). At
a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve
factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial
court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 102,106,897 P.2d 993,997 (1995).

C.

Brown Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred In Denying His Motion
To Suppress Based On His Assertion That His Statements To Police
Were Not Given Voluntarily
Brown first appeared before the court in custody on the initial charges May

3, 2007. (R., p.57.) An order of commitment was entered August 25, 2008 and
amended September 10, 2008 ordering his continued commitment until it was
deemed he was fit to proceed with trial. (R., pp.486-488; 495-496). Brown was
deemed competent to assist in his own defense and proceed to trial in an order
dated January 13, 2009. (R., pp.591-592.) Subsequently, a motion to suppress
was filed February 25, 2010 moving to exclude any confessions made at the time
of his arrest in 2007 as having been made under duress. (R., pp.269-270.) It
does not appear from the record that motion was noticed for a hearing before the
court. However, in an order filed September 13, 2010, the district court denied
Brown's motion to suppress statements of the defendant and other evidence.
(R., pp.923-924.)

The motion, entitled "Motion to Suppress:

Presentment to

Magistrate; Involuntary Confession; and Dissipation of Probable Cause" was
dated September 7, 2012 and addressed at the hearing on September 9, 2012
wherein Brown ultimately entered his conditional Alford pleas.

(R., p.923; see

generally Tr., p.377-408.) The district court concluded when denying Brown's
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motion that "any statements that [Brown] made to law enforcement agencies
were not rendered involuntary based upon any claim of a mental health
deficiency." (Tr., p.394, pp.14-17.)
The State, "in attempting to introduce statements made by a suspect
during a custodial interrogation and outside the presence of an attorney, must
establish a voluntary, knowing and intelligent waiver of the suspect's rights."
State v. Mitchell, 104 Idaho 493, 497, 660 P.2d 1336, 1340 (1983).

In

determining if a waiver is valid, a Court must examine "the totality of
circumstances surrounding the statements to determine whether [they are] the
product of a rational intellect and a free will." Mitchell, 104 Idaho at 499, 660
P.2d at 1342 (citing State v. Powers, 96 Idaho 833, 840, 537 P.2d 1369, 1376
(1975)). "The test of voluntariness is whether, under the totality of the
circumstances, the suspect's will was overborne by police coercion." State v.
Rounsville, 136 Idaho 869,874,42 P.3d 100, 105 (Ct. App. 2002) (citing Arizona
v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 286 (1991); Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157,
163-67 (1986); State v. Radford, 134 Idaho 187, 191, 998 P.2d 80, 84 (2000);
State v. Davila, 127 Idaho 888,892,908 P.2d 581, 585 (Ct. App. 1995)). A trial
court's conclusion that a defendant made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary
waiver of Miranda rights will not be disturbed on appeal where it is supported by
substantial and competent evidence. Luke, 134 Idaho at 297, 1 P.3d at 798.
In this case, Brown supports his position that he was unable to voluntarily
waive his right to remain s·i1ent at the time he was arrested prior to his
incarceration in May of 2007 with the fact that he was found unfit to proceed or
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assist in his own defense over one year later in August 2008. (Appellant's brief,
p.24.) That is not the correct legal standard. The correct legal standard requires
the trial court to determine, under a totality of the circumstances, whether the
suspect's will was overborne by police coercion. Rounsville, 136 Idaho at 874,
42 P.3d at 105. Factors courts have considered in determining the voluntariness
of a waiver include whether Miranda warnings were given, the youth of the
accused, the level of education, the length of the detention, repeated and
prolonged nature of the questioning, and deprivation of food or sleep. State v.
Person, 140 Idaho 934, 937, 104 P.3d 976, 979 (Ct. App. 2004) (citing State v.
Doe, 137 Idaho 519,523,50 P.3d 1014, 1018 (2002)). The district court found
that, based on its observations of Brown in court, Brown had been an active
participant in the legal and factual issues discussed in his case and "any
statements that he made to law enforcement agencies were not rendered
involuntary based upon any claim of a mental health deficiency." (Tr., p.394,
Ls.6-17.)

Brown's claim that his mental condition was such that he did not

knowingly and voluntarily waive his rights is unsupported by any evidence of
what mental condition he had at the time he made incriminating statements to
police or why it would have rendered him incapable of waiving his right to silence.
Further, Brown makes no legal or factual argument as to how evidence of a
subsequent inability to assist in his own defense renders a previous waiver of his
right to silence invalid or involuntary.
Brown has failed to establish any error in the denial of his motion to
suppress statements made to law enforcement as involuntary.
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IV.
Brown Has Failed To Establish The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Not
Allowing Additional Testimony Prior To Denying His Rule 35 Request For
Leniency

A

Introduction
Brown claims the district court abused its discretion when considering his

Rule 35 request for leniency in his sentence by "unduly narrowing the scope of
that discretion when it refused to allow him to testify or present witnesses in
support" of that motion. (Appellant's brief, p.26.) Brown has failed to meet his
burden in establishing the district court abused its discretion.
B.

Standard Of Review
Rule 35 of the Idaho Criminal Rules provides that the trial court may, in its

discretion, decide a motion to modify a sentence without the admission of
evidence and without oral argument.

I.C.R. 35;

State v. Arambula, 97 Idaho

627,630,550 P.2d 130, 133 (1976); State v. Peterson, 126 Idaho 522,525,887
P.2d 67 (Ct. App. 1994) (decision to conduct a hearing on a Rule 35 motion is
directed to the sound discretion of the district court). This discretion is abused
only if the court unreasonably refuses to consider relevant evidence or otherwise
unduly limits the information considered before deciding a Rule 35 motion. State
v. Bayles, 131 Idaho 624, 626, 962 P.2d 395 (Ct. App. 1998).

C.

Brown Has Failed To Establish An Abuse Of Discretion In The District
Court's Refusal To Allow Additional Testimony In Support Of His Rule 35
Motion
If a sentence is within applicable statutory limits, a motion for reduction of

sentence under Rule 35 is a plea for leniency, and this court reviews the denial of
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the motion for an abuse of discretion. State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201,203, 159
P.3d 838, 840 (2007).

Brown entered conditional Alford pleas to the lesser

amended charges of voluntary manslaughter and accessory to grand theft,
reserving his right to appeal all pretrial motions. (R., pp.878-879; 900-902; Tr.,
p.377, L.12 - p.379, L.6.)

At sentencing Brown called six witnesses on his

behalf (Tr., p.411, L.8 - p.432, L.9) in addition to submitting additional letters of
support (Tr., p.432, L.11 - p.433, L.6).

Brown also submitted a pathologist's

report and the report of a polygrapher to the court to aid in sentencing.

(Tr.,

p.433, Ls.8-22.) Brown himself addressed the court. (Tr., p.444, L.15 - p.448,
L.6.)
At a hearing on Brown's Rule 35 motion, the district court was advised of
Brown's desire to provide the testimony of expert witnesses in the form of a
forensic pathologist, a firearms expert and a polygrapher. (See generally R35
Tr., pp.6-7.)

Rule 35 specifically grants the district court authority to "consider[ ]

and determiner ]" a Rule 35 motion "without the admission of additional testimony
and without oral argument." Consistent with Rule 35, the trial court denied the
request for additional testimony finding:
It doesn't seem to me that - that there is much to be gained
here by calling a pathologist, a firearms expert, and a polygrapher.
And as far as those - any testimony from those people would go to
the - seems to me would go to issues of guilt, innocence or guilt,
and that was taken care of when we took the plea.
As far as Mr. Brown is concerned, had the opportunity, as I
stated, and he submitted reams and reams of written material. So I
think that anything he's had to present to the Court has been
presented. So I'm going to exercise my discretion and deny the
request for additional testimony.
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A Rule 35 motion "shall be considered and determined by the court
without the admission of additional testimony and without oral argument, unless
otherwise ordered by the court in its discretion." I.C.R. 35. itA Rule 35 hearing, if
held, takes place after the defendant has been accorded his right to be present at
sentencing.

Thus, the sentencing judge may consider and decide the motion

without any additional testimony." State v. Urias, 123 Idaho 751, 755, 852 P.2d
503, 507 (Ct. App. 1993). The district court had discretion whether to allow oral
argument and whether to allow the presentation of additional testimony. I.C.R.
35. That it allowed the former and disallowed the latter does not show any abuse
of discretion. Although Brown argues the district court abused its discretion by
unduly limiting the information considered in support of his Rule 35 motion, that
position is not supported by the record. Brown addressed the court on the very
issues at sentencing for which he sought reduction of his sentence. Further, at
sentencing he provided reports of two of the type of experts he wished to call at
hearing. The district court determined "the best reading of the facts [did] support
a finding of voluntary manslaughter with the death being at the hands of Mr.
Brown following a quarrel with the decedent."

(Tr., p.449, L.s24 - pA50, L.2.)

As the district court determined in denying the request to present additional
testimony in support of his Rule 35 motion, there was nothing additional to be
gained from rehashing Brown's culpability as that was "taken care of" when the
plea was entered. (R35 Tr., p.11, Ls.10-11.)

23

Brown has failed to show the district court abused its discretion in denying
his request to present what amounted to testimony duplicative of what was
addressed at sentencing in support of his request for leniency of sentence.

V.
Brown Has No Basis To Assert The District Court Erred In Denying His Motion
To Dismiss Based On A Lack Of Probable Cause At Preliminary Hearing
Following This Court's Holding in State v. Manzanares
On appeal Brown asserts that, even in the face of this Court's contrary
holding in State v. Manzanares, 152 Idaho 410,272 P.3d 382 (2012), "that when
a charge has been dismissed pursuant to a conditional guilty plea, challenges to
the sufficiency of the evidence at a preliminary hearing on such a charge are
moot for purposes of appeal," the district court erred in denying his motion to
dismiss for lack of probable cause at preliminary hearing after Brown had entered
conditional pleas of guilty to amended charges. (Appellant's brief, pp.28-29.)
The rule of stare decisis dictates that controlling precedent be followed
unless it is manifestly wrong, has proven over time to be unjust or unwise, or
unless overruling it is necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and
remedy continued injustice. State v. Dana, 137 Idaho 6, 9, 43 P.3d 765, 768
(2002).

Brown has failed to put forth any reason why Mazanares is not

controlling. His claim must be dismissed.
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VI.
Brown Has No Legal Ground To Assert The District Court Erred In Denying
Brown's Motion To Suppress Founded Solely On Federal Law And The Federal
Rules Of Criminal Procedure

Brown filed a motion to suppress statements made to law enforcement
officials following his out of state arrest. The basis for this motion was Brown's
contention that he had not been taken before a federal magistrate within six
hours of his arrest on a fugitive warrant in violation of federal law and the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure. (Tr., p.392, Ls.6-12.) The district court found that
not only did the federal rules not control in Brown's state action, but Brown was
"brought before a state magistrate within the times required by both the
exceptions to Rule 5 [of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure] and by state
law." (Tr., p.392, Ls.13-24.)
Brown nonetheless argues on appeal, "mindful of the inapplicability of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (c) to a state
prosecution," that the district court erred by denying "his motion to suppress
statements obtained in violation of those provisions." (Appellant's brief, pp.2930.) His argument is unsupported by legal authority for his position and should
be dismissed. State v. Grazian, 144 Idaho 510,518,164 P.3d 790, 798 (2007)
("Grazian makes no citation to authority as required by Idaho Appellate Rule
35(a)(6) and has not preserved the issue for appellate review"); State v. Diaz,
144 Idaho 300, 303, 160 P.3d 739, 742 (2007) (claim not preserved for appellate
review where "Diaz failed to present any argument or authority in his opening
brief to support this contention"); State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d
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966, 970 (1996) {"When issues on appeal are not supported by propositions of
law, authority, or argument, they will not be considered."}.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's
denials of Brown's motions and affirm his judgment of conviction and sentence.
DATED this 6th day of Nove ber
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